UKC

Seems to have auto-archived the first part, so here's a continuation
of http://www.ukclimbing.com/forums/t.php?t=528121

In reply to Tim Chappell:


So, the answer to how we decide what "exists" is this (taking the example of the Higgs Boson):

If it has an affect on our detector (in line with that expected for a Higgs) then it "exists".

It if doesn't have an affect on our detector (in line with that expected) then it doesn't "exist".

So, you see, physicists are effectively using my definition to determine whether something "exists", namely "existence" is all about whether something can, in principle, have some discernible effect.

So, can philosophers do better than this definition? Well, from what you've said, they either cop-out or leave it to physicists. In other words the de facto definition being used is my one.

In reply to Coel Hellier:


Oh dear. Another essence/ existence confusion.

In the procedure you describe your physicists are not making any claims at all about how to define "exists". What they're doing is applying tests to determine whether a HB exists.

Would the phrase "out of your depth" have any resonance at this point, I wonder?

In reply to Tim Chappell:



But the two are intimately linked. The tests to determine whether something is in a category are essentially the definition of that category.


Talking to yourself Tim?

In reply to Tim Chappell:

First up thanks to all the contributors to this thread I've learnt new stuff and it's generally made interesting reading.
I'm going to make the mistake of jumping in now I'm sure I really am out of my depth because to me this thread has gone full circle.
Coel has a defintion of exists, the reason Tim really doesn't like it is because it doesn't work for stuff that he believes should exist but don't....
Women Bishops (or God if that's easier!)

In reply to Coel Hellier:
>

I'm sorry, but that's just wildly wrong. This remark suggests that you not only don't understand the word "exists", you also don't understand the word "definition".

Something that keeps getting lost is that believing in god (or any chosen deity) is about just that...belief. It's called having faith, and yes, we scientists can have that faith. Belief in God and having a scientific mind are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Mind you, i know waht IS lacking round here...and that's tolerance! Debate all you want, yes, but in the end, tolerance is the key. One can have a wonderful, healthy debate (the god-bothering ones on here are great)and be tolerant of other people's views, without having to give up your own.

Sxx

In reply to Moomin.williams:


No, you're way off the mark there. I'm contesting what Coel is suggesting because what he's suggesting is wrong, that's all. I don't really mind what the consequences are for philosophy of religion, if any. (If I believed in the ontological argument, presumably I would want to say that existence IS a property.)

In reply to Sarah G:


I did suggest something like this myself, higher up the thread: I suggested that what explanatory power you're prepared to buy at the price of positing what entities was a judgement call on which intelligent people can and do differ. And that how they make that judgement call is often what divides theists from atheists.

I don't know if anyone but you perhaps has taken up this eirenic suggestion of mine.

In reply to Coel Hellier:


Come on Coel, this is one of your weaker moments; best concede it and move on.

Aside from everything else, that 'in principle' is a hopeless link in your argument.

In reply to Sarah G: I don't know about tolerance but the thread was pretty even handed, both coel and tim slung petty ad hominems with gay abandon.

In reply to Sir Chasm:


If I have been ad hominem, then I apologise.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


I suggest that it is you who is wildly wrong. I'm suggesting both a meaning of the word "exists" and a method of determining whether something "exists". (Both of these are de facto used by scientists.)

In contrast, you are not offering a meaning/definition of "exists", not offering any way of determining whether something "exists" and are offering only declarations of "you're wrong".

In reply to Tim Chappell: No apologies necessary, it's quite amusing. As is your "if".

In reply to Coel Hellier: Noooooo! MAKE IT STOP!

In reply to Tim Chappell: You have completely lost me here. Are you saying we just *know* whether something exists or not? That we understand the definition of exists is axiomatic? A bit like the axiom that (I think) 0+1=1?

In reply to Sarah G:


You're hitting on one of my personal bug-bears here. Sure we should be "tolerant" of other people's ideas, but that only means accepting other people's right to express them, it does not mean respecting those ideas or being nice about them.

It's important to keep these concepts clear! http://coelsblog.wordpress.com/2012/09/28/religions-are-entitled-to-toleran...

In reply to Coel Hellier:


There is no merit in making positive claims if they're total nonsense, as yours are, to be honest.

I haven't denied that "exists" has meaning. I've denied that it can be defined in any useful and non-circular way. You've said nothing that suggests otherwise.

However, now I have to go and see a man about an aardvark.

In reply to Sir Chasm:

As is your "if".

Ah. You noticed

In reply to John Gillott:


You're not presenting a refutation ...


Why?

In reply to Tim Chappell:


So what is the meaning of "exists" then? (Close synonyms don't answer that question.)

Or, to take an example, explain the exist/doesn't-exist distinction between X-rays and N-rays, and explain in what way that distinction is meaningful.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

Tim's general points seem sound to me on this one.

Perhaps I'm running the risk of muddying the waters by linking categories to concrete claims, but here goes. According to your way of looking at it:

Did the Higgs exist 100 years ago? Do Tachyons exist now? Will they exist in 300 years time when we have different detectors and different theories? Does, to re-raise a question I asked earlier, 'quantum indeterminism' exist? If it does now did it prior to the early 1900s and will it in 300 years time?

In reply to Coel Hellier:


I have, as I say, no definition of "exists" for you, 'cos there ain't one. As for the meaning of "exists", your query reminds me of the Prince Regent in Blackadder on Johnson's Dictionary. "Tchah, fat lot of good telling us what all these words mean when we already know!"

I can however give you what Aquinas calls a "convertibile" of "exists": namely "good". Whatever exists is good, and vice versa.

That's why the right basic attitude to the world is one of love.

I call as one witness Father Zosima:

love all God's creation, the whole and every grain of sand in it. Love every leaf, every ray of God's light. Love the animals, love the plants, love everything. If you love everything, you will perceive the divine mystery inthings. (Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (Chicago: Great Books 1952), p.167)

And as another Evelyn Underhill:

Gather yourself up, as the exercises of recollection have taught you to do. Then—with attention no longer frittered among the petty accidents and interests of your personal life, but poised, tensed, ready for the work you shall demand of it—stretch out by a distinct act of loving will towards one of the myriad manifestations of life that surround you: and which, in an ordinary way, you hardly notice... Pour yourself towards it, do not draw its image towards you. Deliberate—more, impassioned—attentiveness: this is the condition of success. As to the object of contemplation, it matters little. From Alp to insect, anything will do, provided that your attitude be right: for all things in this world towards which you are stretching out are linked together, and one truly apprehended will be the gateway to the rest. (Evelyn Underhill, Practical Mysticism (New York: Meridian Books, 1955), 93-4)

It would be unrealistic to expect you to like this stuff; but I hope at any rate you find it chewy.

Now, about that aardvark...

In reply to John Gillott:


Yes, because 100 years ago the Higgs had a causal connection to other matter and so could, in principle, have been detected.


I don't know, but the answer is the same for both of those. That's what the "in principle" means, as in, leaving aside us and issues of technology and practicality.


As far as we know, yes


Same answer as just above. None of those things make any difference to an "in principle" interaction with other matter that could in principle be discerned.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


Can't help myself now, I knew I was out of my depth and shouldn't have tried to get involved in a discussion that was so well established.
But,
I can't see where you have described what is wrong with the definition. I agree that if something defininitely "exists" then it's little pointless to define the word exists.
Basic example: the two of us are in a room and there is a red ball on the floor between us. If we both agree that it is there then there's no point in defining the word exist as that is inherent in the fact we have agreed. But if one of us states that the ball is not there then we need some sort of way to work out who is right, or do we just go our separate ways agreeing to disagree.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


?@@??!&#!?? So the smallpox virus and Ian Brady and sin are all "good"?


You have a point there.

In reply to Tim Chappell: Love gas chambers, apartheid, bigotry...

In reply to Tim Chappell:
>

Sorry, as above:

You have completely lost me here. Are you saying we just *know* whether something exists or not? That we understand the definition of exists is axiomatic? A bit like the axiom that (I think) 0+1=1?

In reply to MG:

No, didn't say any of that, and don't wish to.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


Can you attempt my earlier question?

Or, to take an example, explain the exist/doesn't-exist distinction between X-rays and N-rays, and explain in what way that distinction is meaningful.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

You gave us this at the top of the thread:

'So, the answer to how we decide what "exists" is this (taking the example of the Higgs Boson):

If it has an affect on our detector (in line with that expected for a Higgs) then it "exists".'

Now you give us this:

'That's what the "in principle" means, as in, leaving aside us and issues of technology and practicality.'

So can we decide or not? And if you allow things to exist before we discover them, what do you say about things we discover then change our minds about? Did the ether exist for a while then stop existing? Will it make a comeback, existentially speaking?

In reply to John Gillott:


The first was about how *we* determine whether something exists. The second was about whether something does exist. Those are different; whether we know something exists or can in practice determine whether it exists is different from whether it does exist.


We've changed our minds. That of course does not change whether something exists. I suspect that you're not understanding what I mean by "in principle" here. All I mean is that there is a chain of casual links between two things. Whether we humans can, in practice, follow that chain is irrelevant to the "in principle".

In reply to Coel Hellier:

I'm understanding alright. I'm trying to use the 'in principle' claim of yours to point out that you are mixing things up that should be kept distinct. When you make the 'in principle' point you retreat or move from an empiricist approach to something else, a specific kind of ontological claim. You claim that by listing all the elements of the set you define the set. There is some merit in that idea. The problem is that you haven't listed them all and in fact you admit that we (humanity) might not be able to - the fact that we cannot now and might never be able to 'follow that chain' in all cases is very relevant for the argument you have made.

In reply to John Gillott:


Yes, I'm distinguishing between what "exists" and what humans can determine to "exist".


I'm not doing that, I'm specifying a property ("able to have a discernible affect") that something must have to qualify for the set "exists". (Note that the effect being discernIBLE is different from whether humans can discern it.)

In reply to Coel Hellier:



Existence must be assumed, which is why you believe that something "having" being" is just a synonym and not a definition. It is a definition... ...it's a definition that recognises a judgement about that thing whose essence cannot be established a priori. To put it another way, to say something "exists" (outside of just the mind) is to admit a personal commitment to that reality and knowledge about it. Put still another, no knowledge of reality is without some kind of a personal commitment to reality. This harks back to the kind of assumptions I suggest you use, but you deny. Appeals to mere empirical data re the Higgs boson presupposes something about what "exists" means when you make that conclusion based on the empirical data, and therefore Tim is correct, wanting it to be defined in that ways is to provide a circular definition. Perhaps some words from Einstein might help?

A few more remarks of a general nature concerning concepts and [also] concerning the insinuation that a concept - for example that of the real - is something metaphysical (and therefore to be rejected). A basic conceptual distinction, which is a necessary prerequisite of scientific and pre-scientific thinking, is the distinction between "sense-impressions" (and the recollection of such) on the one hand and mere ideas on the other. There is no such thing as a conceptual definition of this distinction (aside from, circular definitions, i.e., of such as make a hidden use of the object to be defined). Nor can it be maintained that at the base of this distinction there is a type of evidence, such as underlies, for example, the distinction between red and blue. Yet, one needs this distinction in order to be able to overcome solipsism. Solution: we shall make use of this distinction unconcerned with the reproach that, in doing so, we are guilty of the metaphysical "original sin." We regard the distinction as a category which we use in order that we might the better find our way in the world of immediate sensations. The "sense" and the justification of this distinction lies simply in this achievement. But this is only a first step. We represent the sense-impressions as conditioned by an "objective" and by a "subjective" factor. For this conceptual distinction there also is no logical-philosophical justification. But if we reject it, we cannot escape solipsism. It is also the presupposition of every kind of physical thinking. Here too, the only justification lies in its usefulness. We are here concerned with "categories" or schemes of thought, the selection of which is, in principle, entirely open to us and whose qualification can only be judged by the degree to which its use contributes to making the totality of the contents of consciousness "intelligible." The above mentioned "objective factor" is the totality of such concepts and conceptual relations as are thought of as independent of experience, viz., of perceptions. So long as we move within the thus programmatically fixed sphere of thought we are thinking physically. Insofar as physical thinking justifies itself, in the more than once indicated sense, by its ability to grasp experiences intellectually, we regard it as "knowledge of the real."

In reply to Coel Hellier:
Hmmm... there are billions of galaxies, each with billions of stars, so presumably billions upon billions of planets. so out there will be many entities vastly cleverer than us. We don't 'know' this, but they still exist, at least that is my belief - just as others believe in god (which I never have) I'd argue my belief is a bit more empirical though. Possibly some of these entiities will also believe in gods?
Higgs - assuming it does exist, not knowing about it previously does not dis-exist (!) it, it merely means we were unaware.
as once said 'there are things we know we know...etc'

by the way, did anyone ever discuss women bishops on this? not much point I suppose. Oh well.

In reply to Jim at Work: There isn't much to say about women bishops, the CoE has said no. I think that means they don't exist.

In reply to John Gillott:

To illustrate what I mean by "in principle", consider a super-observer who knows everything about every proton, neutron and electron around, and who can manipulate them into any detector-configuration, and who has infinite time to make a detection (this to get round possible light-travel-time limits on causality). If this super-observer could discern the effect of something, then it "exists"; if there is no way that he could, then it doesn't "exist". That super-observer is what I mean by "in principle", as in ignoring any practical considerations.

In reply to Jim at Work:


Obviously.

In reply to Coel Hellier: I just don't understand why women are so upset that they can't bash the bishop. surely smacking the pony is a worth alternative?

In reply to Coel Hellier:

I'm tempted to say, no I will say... you're assuming the existence of an all-powerful God in order to construct a definition of 'existence' that you will go on to use to cast severe doubt on the existence of God? Have I got that right?

You don't know what is possible or not possible in the future and we don't have infinite time. And given that you're a non-believer you don't think God does either. So, what have you achieved with this definition? Not much.

In reply to John Gillott:


Nope, I'm illustrating what I mean by "in principle". And I'm a bit baffled as to why it is such a hard concept.


Sure, and that is a limitation on **human** knowledge about what exists. That does not mean that it is a limitation on what exists.


I've achieved a definition of what "exist" means and it accords with methods of determining whether something exists. That's quite a bit more than the philosophers have achieved, according to Tim.

But yes, it wasn't supposed to be some amazing advance, it's just a definition of a word. I'm not wedded to it, I'm just not aware of a better one.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

Please can we go back to quantum indeterminism, emergence and evolution. So much more interesting than quibbling over definitions.

In reply to Coel Hellier:


Out of interest, is it one you developed, or is there another source?

In reply to Coel Hellier:


You haven't defined "exist". If you had, then it would be logically inconceivable that something should exist and not be detected by your (oh the irony here) Omniscient Observer. But it is logically conceivable that something exist and not be so detected. Fail. And a pretty bad fail, too: it seems you don't understand the ground-rules for formulating definitions.

In reply to Tim Chappell: I still have no idea what you are getting at. "Whatever exists is good, and vice versa. " just seems bonkers read straight. I assume you and other philosophers do mean something sensible by phrases such as this. Perhaps you could attempt to explain in normal language?

But anyway you seem to be trying to use "exist" in a highly technical/jargony sort of way. Coel's approach seems a reasonable starting point from a practical point of view wouldn't you say? Is that a spoon or an illusion?

Ah, I can pick it up, it interacts with me, therefore it exists.

or

Ah, I try and pick it up and there is nothing, I must be imagining it. It doesn't exist.

(and please don't get hung up on "imagining" or "illusions", that's not the point).

In reply to MG:


I'm not aware of any source for it, so I think it's one I came up with. But as I say, it's only a suggestion, and if people can produce a better one ...

In reply to MG:]

you seem to be trying to use "exist" in a highly technical/jargony sort of way.


Sorry about that; we humble philosophers do occasionally find a bit of technicality helps precision. Unlike physicists, of course.

In reply to Coel Hellier:


It's not even a suggestion!

In reply to MG:



There's no problem with these inferences. But they have nothing to do with whether "exists" can be defined or not.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


Yes I have.


That depends on how you define "exist", doesn't it? So far you haven't.


You haven't shown anything wrong with it.


Back to your "arguing" by simply declaring yourself right. That's feeble. Tim, you're evading again. Care to address my earlier challenge?:

"Or, to take an example, explain the exist/doesn't-exist distinction between X-rays and N-rays, and explain in what way that distinction is meaningful."

If you don't like the physicsy nature of that one, try horses and unicorns instead.

In reply to Coel Hellier:


Look: for a definition to work, the definiens has at least to supply a necessary and sufficient condition for the definiendum. Your supposed definition fails that minimal test. Therefore, it can't be an adequate definition.

If you don't understand this, or won't, I'm not sure what I can say to help you.

I think I might be better spending the time on my aardvark, frankly.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


In what way?

And you're once again failing to explain what you think the meaning of "exists" is or the distinction between "exists" and "doesn't exist".

In reply to Tim Chappell:


Did you know JRR Tolkein defined aardvark for the OED?

In reply to Coel Hellier:


Listen very carefully: there is a possible situation in which something exists and is not perceived by your Omniscient Observer. This possible situation is a counterexample to your supposed equivalence.

I have already explained what I think "exists" means. It means "exists". It's a basic term. You can gloss it, e.g. by saying if it exists you can bump into it, if it exists you can count it, etc., but you can't define it because there is no more basic vocabulary in which to define it.

Got it now?

In reply to Coel Hellier:

According to your definition God can say whether something exists or not, but mere mortals can't - how could humans know that 'there is no way that he could'?

Your definition fails, clearly, for making definite statements about non-existence. But it's not even great for making statements about things that we want to say do exist - if we change our minds, we got it wrong you say. Wrong in what sense? Wrong in relation to objective existence you say. Oh that, that undefined out there that you were supposed to be defining.

In reply to Tim Chappell:
Physicists use maths to ensure precision / avoid ambiguity. Maybe philosophers could do something similar ?

In reply to 999thAndy:


We do. And we use logic. Where appropriate. And "where appropriate" is an extremely interesting and rather murky question....

In reply to Tim Chappell:


So Tim, does/do god/s exist?

In reply to Shani:


Yes, but that wasn't what we were discussing.

In reply to Tim Chappell: Are there other concepts you regard as indefinable?

In reply to MG:

"Possible" and "Necessary" are the usual examples: they're not usefully definable except via each other (possibly p = not necessarily not p; necessarily p = not possibly not p).

"Actual", perhaps.

Maybe other things. Very probably "God", for instance.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


Whether that is possible depends on your definition of exists! Since you haven't given us a definition of "exists" you have no basis for asserting the above!


You haven't shown that it is a counterexample because you haven't shown that an item that is "not perceived by my super-observer" could be in the category "exists".


Ok if you're happy with that, but I think my definition does better. And surely you accept that you need a process for deciding what does exist and what doesn't exist? What is your process for doing that?

Are you really saying that you have no way whatsoever of determining whether something "exists"? If you do, tell us how you do it. Or are you claiming that you just "know" what "exists"?

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Oh, and "not".

In reply to Tim Chappell: well could you prove that "exist" is undefinable, using maths? Or any other logical tool - apart from written English ?

In reply to Coel Hellier:

Oh for goodness' sake. I'm not going to repeat myself again, just because you can't or won't understand. I've already explained myself fully. If you still don't get it, I don't know what to suggest.

I wonder what the dictionary says under "exists"? I don't think I've ever looked.

In reply to John Gillott:


Mere mortals have limited knowledge yes. I don't see that as a problem for my definition! Mortals can determine that something does exist (by detecting it), and they can determine that something does not exist provided that that thing is postulated such that its effects would be detectable by humans.


I'm sorry, there's nothing "clear" about that to me, can you elucidate?


Wrong in the sense that our knowledge about the world was wrong. That happens a lot. I'm utterly baffled by why this is such a big issue for you.

In reply to Coel Hellier:


But one comment I can't resist:

Are you really saying that you have no way whatsoever of determining whether something "exists"?


Of course I'm not. I'm saying I don't do it by defining "exists". And neither do you.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


You're the one who is totally failing to get it Tim!

Tim, how do you decide whether something "exists"? What is your process for doing that?

In reply to Tim Chappell:

>> Are you really saying that you have no way whatsoever of determining whether something "exists"?


So how do you do it?

In reply to Coel Hellier:


By looking at the evidence, of course.

Coel, you really are out of your depth on this topic. I've disproved your supposed definition, and you don't even get the disproof. I don't think there's any point in continuing this.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


I did ten minutes ago- "is part of reality". I can see *that* is circular.

In reply to Tim Chappell: Taking Coel's (rough) definition of Exists=detectable. Are you saying it is circular because you could turn it round and say detectable=exists?

In reply to Tim Chappell:


Exactly. So "exists" becomes defined as "there is evidence for it". Now if we ask about types of evidence, we get back to discernible effects on things we can observe.

If you don't agree with that, explain some other way in which the distinction between "exists" and "doesn't exist" can be meaningful.


Wrong.


Wrong.


And you don't get why your "disproof" is not a disproof.


Not unless you can do better than you currently are, no.

In reply to MG:

My 1950s OED says exist = DEF "to be, to have objective being". And gives "to live" and "to continue to live" and "to survive" as subsidiary meanings.

Dictionary evidence is not conclusive; but this does I think support what I've been saying, that "exists" isn't non-circularly or non-trivially definable.

In reply to Coel Hellier:



You're doing it again, Coel. For a definition to work, it has to be inconceivable that the definiens should come apart from the definiendum. But it's not inconceivable that what exists should come apart from what there is evidence for. Once again, you're just showing that you don't understand what a definition is.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


Under my definition, it is (given the addition of an "in principle"). Thus my definition is self-consistent; you have not shown any problem with it.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

Clearly (geddit) we're both baffled by the other's failure to grasp what appear to each of us to be ABC points. I've got to go out in a bit I'm afraid so will have to leave it soon (for today).

My general point is that you are attempting to use a pragmatic empiricist approach, one which serves science well, to do something else, define 'existence'. I think that fails. Humans, though they might change their minds, can say, according to your definition, that some things exist and that some things do not exist. What they cannot do is say that certain things cannot exist. On your definition only God could do that. Now, as I understand it, your definition depends on being able to do what humans cannot do, say that certain things could not exist. Therefore, your definition fails because it is a definition made by a human for humans to work with.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

Then your definition is (a) circular and (b) counter-intuitive.

a) My claim was that there is no *non-circular* definition of "exists". Your definition of "exists" is "seen by the super-observer, who sees everything that exists". Which is patently circular.

b) It's highly counter-intuitive that it should be *absolutely inconceivable* for something to exist, but not be perceived by such a super-observer. Unless of course--oh the irony again--that super-observer is God.

Face it, you're stuffed.

In reply to John Gillott:


Agreed, not with certainty, no. Human knowledge is provisional. That's an accepted part of science, so I don't see why this is any problem for my definition.


No, not at all. It doesn't depend on anyone doing anything at all. Here, I'll restate the same thing without the "super observer" if you prefer:

{Entity} "exists" if there is a chain of possible causal links between {entity} and our sense data. If there is no possible chain of causal links then {entity} does not exist.

In reply to Coel Hellier:


If that's supposed to be a definition of "exists" it is utterly hopeless. On this definition, there cannot be more than one space-time continuum.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


But then that's not my definition! And my actual definition is not circular.


Being "counter-intuitive" is not really a problem for my definition, that in itself is not a killer.


As I've just done, I can restate the definition without the "super-observer" -- that was only an illustration of "in principle", it wasn't part of the definition.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


(1) Yes, (2) Why is that a problem?

In reply to 999thAndy:


Such dependence on maths is a form of idealism, which in my view only encourages anti-realism.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Since this definition implies that nothing outside this causal order exists, it also entails that numbers don't exist, unless numbers are part of the causal order. But that surely shouldn't follow just from the definition of "exists".

Your new definition is (if anything) less promising than your previous one.

Face it, you really are stuffed.

In reply to Coel Hellier:



Oh for heaven's sake... because it's conceivable that there could be more than one. Indeed lots of physicists are busy conceiving it.

In reply to Coel Hellier: Your original definition was, I think

"could not, even in principle, have any discernible effect on anything we're aware of"

I assume Tim is objecting to (although why he won't say what he thinks clearly is beyond me) "... effect on anything we're aware of" as being circular. If this is indeed what he is saying, I think he has a point, no?

In reply to Tim Chappell:

But then the would be detectable surely, and hence exist under Coel's definition?

In reply to MG:

No, because conceiving is not detecting.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

All this banter between you and Coel is very endearing, but rather tedious.

I'm not saying I agree with his definition, and if Coel claimed that 'exists' meant 'was green', then he'd obviously be wrong. But you couldn't argue against the validity of his definition without offering an example of something which 'exists' but isn't green, which involves invoking an alternative definition of 'exists'.

Waving your hands around in the air and crying about circularity is all very well, but it means you cannot disprove Coel's definition. So stop pretending that you can.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

I can conceive of a dragon, that doesn't mean dragons exist.

In reply to victim of mathematics:

without offering an example of something which 'exists' but isn't green, which involves invoking an alternative definition of 'exists'.


--This is the bit where you go wrong-- I don't need an alternative definition of "exists". I just need an account of the meaning of "exists". Which I've given. Hence...

it means you cannot disprove Coel's definition.

--But I can. I keep on doing, every time he offers one. I've disproved all his suggestions so far, simply by providing counter-examples to them-- conceivable cases where we have his definiens, but not his definiendum, or vice versa. I'm confident I can keep it up, aardvark permitting, pretty well indefinitely. Now there's a threat

This is *why* I deny that "exists" can be defined: because whatever anyone comes up with as a definition, it's going to go the same way.

In reply to MG:

I agree. Conceivability isn't a criterion or definition of existence either, because conceivably there are inconceivable existents.

In reply to Tim Chappell: So Coel's definition survives.

In reply to MG:

Eh? No.

In reply to Tim Chappell: Can you clarify whether my post at 17.06 summarizes your objection?

In reply to Tim Chappell:

I'm not sure what you mean by "An account", but all you've offered here is some nonsense about all that exists being good, which is patently nonsense without some context that you haven't deigned to share with us.


But you aren't 'disproving' anything. You haven't provided any "Counter-examples", just waved your hands about and made smug pronouncements about how right you are, without any actual counter-examples or proof.

In reply to MG:

No, it doesn't... various posts by, er, myself would do that

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Eh? Yes! The definition doesn't mention conceiving, just detecting.

In reply to victim of mathematics:


I'll ignore the abusive bits, and confine myself to saying: if you don't think I've provided counter-examples, take another look.

E.g. Coel said something about existence having to do with being possibly in causal touch with us; I pointed out that other spacetime continua and numbers are both counter-examples. Does that satisfy your exacting requirements?

In reply to MG:

Nope. Cp. my earlier counter-examples.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Well clearly not. Look at the number of people clearly baffled by your posts. If you can't explain what you mean to a range of obviously reasonably bright people either a) you don't really know yourself or b) you are being awkward, AKA trolling. I am going increasingly for b).

In reply to MG:

No, I'm just trying to get at the truth, which, except on jokey threads, is all I ever do really.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Ignore the bits you don't like because you can't/don't want to address them, you mean? That's your debating style in a nutshell.

But anyway, if there are other spacetime continua (is that really the plural?) then by Coel's definition either they are detectable to us, in which case they exist, or they aren't, in which case they don't. This isn't a counter-example unless you invoke a definition of 'exist' whereby other continua which we can't interact with do. But you've refused to do that. The same with numbers. You can't offer them as a counter-example without saying that they exist, which involves invoking an alternative definition of 'exist' and if you won't define what that is then you don't have an argument, just some waffle.

In reply to victim of mathematics:

If you are abusive to me, I don't really see the point of being abusive back. YOu want me to be? Is that your debating style, in a nutshell?

You write:
if there are other spacetime continua (is that really the plural?) then by Coel's definition either they are detectable to us, in which case they exist, or they aren't, in which case they don't

You have noticed that you contradict yourself here, haven't you? "If there ARE other spacetime continua... they don't exist"?

I mention this simply because it illustrates nicely that we don't need a definition of "exists" to use the concept.

In reply to Tim Chappell:



How is that a problem, other than one for language? If these other entities can't interact with us, then defining them as non-existent seems fine to me.

I suppose in theory you might need a bigger word at some point to include all the various things that can't interact with us too.

In reply to MG:

Of course it's not all right to say "they can't interact with us, so they don't exist"!

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Why?

In reply to Tim Chappell:
FFS Tim! Tell the pompous pricks you didn't expect the "Spanish Inquisition"!

In reply to MG:


Well, I'm tempted to say it's not all right morally--there's a sort of local chauvinism about it.

But the point here is that Coel(until he mysteriously disappeared from this thread) was trying to define "exists". You can't deal with a counter-example just by saying "Oh yeah, but who cares".

In reply to dek:

But actually I did expect it-- it's always like this. If nothing else it's a workout: "What does not kill us makes us strong" :-0

In reply to Coel Hellier:
>

How can you be sure that wasn't Divine intervention?

In reply to Tim Chappell:

I am sure non-existent entities will cope with us being rude about them.


But there still hasn't been a counter-example!

In reply to Tim Chappell:
Okay, fetch Cardinal Tim Ximinez a comfy chair!!

In reply to MG:

I don't know how you can think that. Coel suggested "exists" = DEF "is possibly in causal contact with us". I pointed out *two* counter-examples, numbers and other spacetimes. How can you deny that there are counter-examples? I'm genuinely baffled.

In reply to dek:

THREE DEACONS: confess! confess! confess! confess!

FOURTH DEACON: I confess!

FIRST DEACON: not YOU!

In reply to Tim Chappell: the philosopher Nietzsche, that mighty inspiration to Adolf Hitler, who invented the dodgy statement "whatever does not kill me makes me stronger" had syphilis which first made him sick and then sent him bonkers, even more bonkers than he already was. Not sure if it eventually killed him; certainly not immediately. There are a lot of people missing limbs, confined to wheelchairs etc. who wouldn't really agree that "whatever does not kill me makes me stronger". I think I rather favour a graffiti from my undergraduate days: `"God is dead" - Nietzsche. "Nietzsche is dead" - God.`

In reply to Tim Chappell:
But I only came in to tell thee, there was 'trouble at tmill'!!

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Other space-times we just did - either they are detectable and exist under the definition, or they are not and don't exist. Numbers are the closest you have come, I think, to a counter-example. They clearly don't exist under the definition but maybe that is because they don't in fact exist - I think there was suggestion above they are mental abstractions, a bit like "happiness".

In reply to solocavediver:


I'm not actually much of a fan of Nietzsche, but he had some great one-liners. And I think it's absolutely certain that he would have *despised* Hitler.

If you want a philosopher to blame for Hitler, I'd go for Heidegger, who has no one-liners at all; he doesn't even have one-paragraphers.

In reply to MG:


That's too quick. These other spacetimes only need to be conceivable. And they are clearly that.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

We did that too! And agreed conceivable things (e.g. dragons) don't have to exist.

In reply to MG:


That they don't have to exist isn't the point. The point is that the question of the existence of dragons is not settled by their being in causal contact or not with us.

In reply to dek:


I came in here for a good argument!

In reply to Tim Chappell:

It is under the definition we are discussing. If you don't like the definition, propose another one that includes non-causal dragons.

In reply to MG: In reply to PMP's post that might reappear!

I mentioned this above, and I think you are probably right, but apparently it isn't Tim's objection, which I am still trying to understand.

In reply to MG:

No, the definition said: to exist is to be possibly in causal contact with us. The general form of my response is: there are things that conceivably exist, but aren't possibly in causal contact with us. Other spacetimes are an example. Such cases are counter-examples to the proposed definition. Therefore the definition fails. That's it.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

The basic problem is that Coel's whole approach is circular on numerous levels:

eg. If the definition of "exist" is something that we can detect then only things that we can detect exist. Obviously.

By establishing definitions in this way one can establish a coherent and logical framework which is obviously something Coel feels comfortable with.

Conversely, definitions and terms which are "open ended" and don't lend themselves to "evidence" of the form that Coel requires but will not define are regarded as inadequate.

But that the latter does not make them wrong. It simply acknowledges that there may be something(s) that either we are never able to be aware of or if we are aware of it we have not way of understanding what it is that we are aware of. It is simply a reflection of the idea that that there are things of which we cannot know and therefore cannot define that the terminology to describe this will not be as precise as that used to describe something more limited.

I can't help but be reminded by the former of a child covering his eyes with his hands and believing that he's invisible.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

The general form of my response is: there are things that conceivably exist,

But you are using (an unspecified) definition of "exist" here ^^^ which is different to the one in the previous sentence.

In reply to MG:


No, I'm not using any such definition. I don't have a definition of "exist". I have an account of what "exist" means, but no definition. My position (it's a pretty standard one in philosophy) is that there can be no informative, non-circular definition, because "exist" is a logically basic concept. I've said this several times now.

PS Perhaps this helps: think again about "possibly" and "necessarily". All you can do to define "possibly" is say "not necessarily not". Conversely, all you can do to define "necessarily" is say "not possibly not". Beyond that rather neat but also rather trivial interdefinition, these terms aren't definable. What I'm saying about "exists" is similar, except that there's nothing that stands to "exists" as "possibly" stands to "necessarily".

Oh I don't know, maybe that doesn't help...

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Indeed you have but it seems to be an entirely different (non)definition to the one Coel is proposing and also to that used by scientists and people in everyday life. As above, if you are going to use technical definitions of words you need to be clear about that and recognise it and also explain it to others when you are doing so. If I use "stress" at work it will mean something quite different to how you would use it. I can't simply assert I am right and you are wrong.

I think Coel's is probably circular, but assuming for the moment it isn't, it does appear practically useful as it defines what we can interact with, in principle, which strikes me as a useful category. I can't really see a use for your non-definition.

In reply to MG:


To include somthing that we can't interact with.

In reply to MG:

"Scientists and people in everyday life" don't, in my experience, use any definition of "exists" at all. They may be looking for particular kinds of things, e.g. Higgs Bosons, and therefore look for particular kinds of signs or evidence that whateveritis exists. But they don't use definitions. So my account maps their behaviour perfectly well.

In reply to Postmanpat:

Have you ever needed that concept?

In reply to MG:

Just a thought, but if this other space-time continuum has people in it who can't interact with us, just as we can't interact with them, then presumably by the same argument they would define us as non-existent. Does this mean that we don't exist? And if so, does that mean I don't have to bother getting up in the morning?

In reply to MG:

Yes, but what has that got to do with it?

In reply to Tim Chappell:

But they do (at least a de facto one) and that definition they are using must approximate Coel's. If they show they interaction with HGs, they will decide it exists. If there is no interaction, they will decide it doesn't exist. Under your "account" there could be HGs all other the shop that don't interact with us in any way that exist. I would be quite happy to say they don't exist.

In reply to owlart:
And if so, does that mean I don't have to bother getting up in the morning?

Yep, just explain to your employer you no longer exist. All problems solved.

In reply to Postmanpat:

Oh OK. You need a new word then.

In reply to owlart:

There are theorists of possibility (e.g. David Lewis) who say that "actual" is indexical, so this world is only real from the point of view of this world, and each other world is equally real from its viewpoint. (Each world is an isolated spacetime continuum.)

So from any other world, you are indeed non-existent, or at least, non-actual, and therefore face only possible consequences if you don't heave your possible sorry arse out of your possible stinky bed of a possible morning

In reply to MG:


What you say goes on, but it isn't defining "exists".

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Right. We have looped. And anyway, I need to go and play squash. Night!

Under your "account" there could be HGs all other the shop that don't interact with us in any way that exist. I would be quite happy to say they don't exist.


You've contradicted yourself here, too: "there could BE HGs" etc., then "they don't exist".

If there ARE such HGs, then don't say they don't exist!

Enjoy your squash.

In reply to MG:

No I don't. Coel needs one to embrace his caveat to the term.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Sigh.

It seems MG and I are of the same opinion. We aren't necessarily saying Coel's definition is correct, but that your so-called 'counter-examples' are nothing of the sort.

Since you are getting hung up about definitions, just because there "are" HGs, that doesn't mean they "exist", unless you can offer a definition of "exist" which includes "are". Which you won't, and therefore there isn't a contradiction.

In reply to victim of mathematics:

Is "are" the same as "is" ?

In reply to victim of mathematics:


Sure I'll offer a definition of "exist" which includes "are". In fact, I already have. Check out my quotation from the OED above.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Hi Tim,

I'm another one struggling to understand your point.

You don't have a definition of "exists" and in fact you claim it can't be defined. OK, fine. But you seem to believe that some things nevertheless do in fact exist, so you must have some way of recognising at least some of those things that do exist. It would be helpful if you could say whether the following exist, as you understand the term:

- you
- me
- happiness
- The natural numbers
- electrons
- the Higgs Boson
- an integer that is both even and odd

In reply to crossdressingrodney:

you seem to believe that some things nevertheless do in fact exist,


--"nevertheless"? As if there were tension between x's existing, and "exists" not being definable? Don't see the tension TBH.

so you must have some way of recognising at least some of those things that do exist.

--Sure. Ways rather than way, but yes.

It would be helpful if you could say whether the following exist, as you understand the term:

--I don't actually see how it helps, but since you ask...

Yes--last time I checked, anyway
Yes (so far as I can tell, though I bet CDR isn't your real name)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Pass-- I'm waiting for the physicists to tell me
No, because this is a contradiction

In reply to Tim Chappell:


But how will they know? If there isn't a definition then how do you know that their "ways" of knowing whether something exists or not are the same as your "ways"?

In reply to victim of mathematics:


Sure, and how will the baby find the nipple without a definition of milk?

What on earth makes you think that we can't know anything until we have definitions of everything?

Have you been talking to that Socrates?

In reply to Postmanpat:


Yes, and it presupposes:
a) existence
and b) "exist" must also be an intrinsic part of "detection", both physically in terms of apparatus to do the detection, which has to "exist" and intellectually "in terms of other foundational aspects of physics that have been previously established to "exist" and which are being relied upon.

This kind of definition is completely circular, and it goes back to what I was saying earlier on in the previous thread to do with the presumptions / assumptions one makes about reality, which Coel simply denies, e.g.

Me:

Coel:
Well yes, but this isn't a fundamental a priori assumption, it's an evaluation of evidence. For example, plenty of humans have died, and the world just carried on without them; and all the evidence says that we are similar to other humans. Again, if you want some other account to be taken seriously, then it needs to be developed to the point of doing a better job overall given everything we know about the universe.

From:
http://www.ukclimbing.com/forums/t.php?t=528121&v=1#x7110147

The point is you have to make a fundamental commitment to existence / being / reality before you can start to unravel its mysteries, e.g. do science. Defining these things with intrinsic reference to themselves is just to posit circular definitions. It also doesn't allow for things that we can't detect, but do exist, and denying this is to have the word "exist" suit your prejudice / worldview. My own view is that exists isn't definable in an absolute sense, but it is a concept established because of the one thing we think we know for sure, which is that "I am", and I call that "being". The question posed by what my external senses perceive is one which I can deny (skepticism) or commit to. That commitment involves an attribution of "being" to the things one experiences, and that is to believe that they also "exist".

In reply to Tim Chappell:

That's a delightfully tangential aside, but it misses my point entirely.

If you are relying on somebody else to tell you whether something exists or not, how can you be confident in that information if you don't (and even by your argument, can't) agree what it means to exist?

In reply to victim of mathematics:

Why do you think that finding a definition of "exists" is the only way of agreeing what "exists" means? And why do you think that *agreeing* what "exists" means is essential to *knowing* what "exists" means?

To repeat the aside-- do you think babies are stuck for food until they agree what "milk" means?

If you want to know where I'm coming from with all this, the answer is Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.

I would apologise if that sounds pretentious, except that I fear it's a little late for that

In reply to crossdressingrodney:


Again, my view is that the way we do this is with the coordination of our senses of our external world with the one piece of knowledge we think is securely established, that I am. This feeling, quality, which we call "being" is something we attribute to things appreciated by our sense of the world around us, i.e. that the world also has "being". We can't define these terms, but there is a referential "essence" that we can appreciate subjectively and attribute to other things.

In reply to victim of mathematics:

This is all a bit ridiculous isn't it? I'm can't really find a side to take here but having trawled the whole thread I noticed Jimbo's sane contribution which then seemed to be ignored and a lot of really pointless debate.

I then went back to the top and re-read Coel's original post:

If it has an affect on our detector (in line with that expected for a Higgs) then it "exists".

It if doesn't have an affect on our detector (in line with that expected) then it doesn't "exist".

If you re-word his statement it's basically saying that you make a hypothesis and a device to test it with and if the evidence you gather has been produced under controlled, unbiased conditions and is reliable then it can be used as evidence to support the hypothesis. You could even say you could add it to a theory. All the stuff about existence was surely ditched by most philosophers long ago, including most of those of faith (I may be completely wrong on the last point).

In reply to Tim Chappell:


Agree (!).

In reply to Jimbo W:

Again, I agree with Jimbo (!). But what he's saying isn't so difficult, and I'm not sure there's much worth adding to it, is there?

In reply to Jimbo W:

In reply to Jimbo W:

That sounds a bit like G M Hopkins' philosophical writings...


[W]hen we consider the mind; when I consider my selfbeing, my consciousness and feeling of myself, that taste of myself, of I and me above and in all things… is more distinctive than the taste of ale or alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnutleaf or camphor, and is incommunicable by any means to another man… Nothing else in nature comes near this unspeakable stress of pitch, distinctiveness, and selving, this selfbeing of my own. Nothing explains it or resembles it, except so far as this, that other men to themselves have the same feeling… But to me there is no resemblance: searching nature I taste self but at one tankard, that of my own being.

Gerard Manley Hopkins, “Comments on the Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola” [1880], in Gardner 1953: 145-6

I'd go with Coel's line of reasoning in limiting our definition of Existence to our potentially knowable world, i.e. that set of entities which are causally connected, or some such.

Sure we can conceive of potential entities outside of this set and we can conceive of them having some kind of alternate Existence utterly (and necessarily) independent of our world with no possibility of ever interacting with any entity in our world. So because they cannot be included in Coel's definition of Existence we therefore need another word big enough to include conceptual things which could never be anything other than conceptual to observers in our world.

How about we call this set of all unknowable things Wishful Thinking?

I can name at least One thing I'd put in it for a start.

In reply to Tim Chappell:
Clearly there are differences between what you and Coel think is meant by 'X' exists, therefore a definition of 'exists' would seem to be a requirement to bring this thread to an end before we all run out of bandwidth.

Earlier you stated that such a definition was not possible and I asked whether you could prove, mathematically, logically or otherwise that such a definition is impossible, but you haven't. If you could that would be great and I'd be interested to read it.

In reply to john arran:


So here you admit that Coel's definition--which you've just signed up for--does not in fact work. Oh well, never mind, eh?

In reply to john arran:
ie.Actually you don't accept Coel's definition

In reply to 999thAndy:


What would a proof of this look like? The evidence that persuades most, not all, philosophers to say that "exists" can't be defined is basically the argument that I've been advancing-- i.e., any attempt to define "exists" gets shot down in flames because it meets counter-examples that almost anyone can see.

I was thinking about replying to you, but I didn't get round to it because other people distracted me with other stuff--and also, there was a hungry aardvark to accommodate.

What I was going to say was that in modern formal logic it's presupposed--but not argued--that existence is not a property, and hence (presumably) not the kind of thing that can be defined. Because in modern formal logic existence is represented by the existential quantifier, backwards E, not by the property-variable F.

So in modern formal logic the way to say "Tim has brown hair" is

(Fa)

--where F is the property, brown-hairedness, and a is the subject of this property, Tim.

Whereas in modern formal logic the way to say "Tim exists" is

Ex (x = T)

--to be pronounced "There exists something such that it is identical with Tim". (Sorry, I can't get that E to go backwards.)

So, being identical with Tim might be a property in modern logic. Existing isn't.

I accept that presupposing that existence isn't a predicate is not arguing that existence isn't a predicate. On the other hand, that presupposition has served formal and philosophical logic pretty well in the 140 years since Frege first proposed it.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Come to think of it, if someone wanted to offer "is identical with something" as a gloss on or even definition of "exists", that would be fine by me. But this isn't a substantive definition of the kind Coel was after (before he vanished utterly). It's more like defining "possibly" as "not necessarily not".

In reply to Tim Chappell:

That's where your argument gets ridiculous as you fail to make any distinction between thought and existence. I said we can conceive of potential entities. I didn't say that they were a reality in any sense other than conceptual. Hence the wider term.

And your patronising tone would be funny if it weren't laughable.

In reply to john arran:
I said we can conceive of potential entities.


Then you concede the key point, which is that there are possible counter-examples.

I'm sorry you don't like my tone. Though perhaps my actual tone is not quite what you take it to be, at the other end of the ether and filtered, perhaps, through a variety of preconceptions. I'm just trying to get things straight, as usual. I am the humblest of all pilgrims on the road to truth, and delighted by any and every company on that journey including yours.

In reply to Tim Chappell:
Thing is, in maths, it only takes one counter argument to prove something is not true. So the question of 'persuausion' doesn't arise.

In reply to 999thAndy:

But this isn't maths. It's philosophical logic. So the question of 'persuasion' does arise-- just as it does in philosophy of maths.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

So there is no 'true'?

In reply to 999thAndy:

Did I say that? I don't remember saying that

In reply to Tim Chappell:


Are you deliberately being ridiculous or is it not entirely clear from what I said that any possible counter-examples can to us never be no more than conceptual and therefore fall into the Wishful Thinking set rather than the Exists set.

In reply to john arran:


It doesn't matter what set you put them in, provided you admit that there are possible existents that don't fit the definition.

And no, I'm not being deliberately ridiculous. Nor indeed unintentionally ridiculous.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


... which is why you'll find I didn't admit anything of the sort. I merely said we could conceive of such a concept. It's the concept that exists not the conceived entity. We can conceive of dragons and gods too but that equally says nothing about their potential for any kind of reality outside of our own imagination.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Well you used a quasi mathematical series of statements, which lead me to assume that, just as in real maths, such statements would be 'true' or 'false'.

I didn't realise you philosophers read a paper then took a vote on it.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Well, I guess I don't know how to reason about things that I can't define. Perhaps this is a mathematician's hang-up, but it seems like the 'tension' is not just felt by me!

Like what? Being able to point at the thing?

Correct on both counts. Plausible deniability to future employers.

In reply to john arran:


That's the admission I'm talking about. Thank you.

In reply to 999thAndy:

And so they are.


No one except you is suggesting that "we philosophers" do anything like that. Isn't this snarky sarky stuff a bit pointless, Andy?

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Ok so now I know you are definitely being ridiculous. I gave you more credit than that.

In reply to Coel Hellier: can I have a pound on Tim to be this week's top poster please?

In reply to crossdressingrodney:

Of course you do. Do you need to know how to define "bus" to work out whether you can catch the 3.45?


If I were naming a femme persona, I think I'd name her Marlene Beatnik. I'd get to wear fishnets, and very very short skirts...

<double takes>
<gives himself good hard slap>

In reply to john arran:


I'm sorry you think that; I can't see why.

In reply to ripper:


Looks like he's fled the country

In reply to Tim Chappell:

If your statements are true or false in the mathematical sense, why does anyone need persuading?

In reply to Tim Chappell: I can't claim to have followed the argument time but I salute your stamina sir, and your indefatigability (second time I've said that today!)

In reply to 999thAndy:


Because there are other kinds of truth or falsity besides mathematical.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

May have fled the planet to a new one, at least conceptually

In reply to ripper:


Thanks.

Do I get to bet on whether I'll be this week's Top of the Nerd Parade?

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Then you're using the wrong tool for the job.

In reply to Tim Chappell: i think you'd be a strong contender - if such a thing existed...

In reply to 999thAndy: Horlicks time. See you all tommorrow.

In reply to 999thAndy:


Why so? The job isn't mathematical, so neither are the tools.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


Perhaps something to do with your wilful misinterpretation of my having postulated the existence of a concept as the existence of the conceived entity itself, as I explained already, which you chose to overlook.

It shouldn't come as any surprise to you that my Wishful Thinking set, being full of concepts only, is entirely consistent with being a subset of Coel's Exists set. No indication then of anything outside of Exists for you to get excited about, and certainly not the counter-example you seem to presume was obvious.

Anyway I'm off to bed now - I'm in a different time zone and it's 3 hours later here and after midnight. You can pretend I'm running away too if you like.

In reply to john arran:

I haven't *wilfully* misinterpreted anything. If I've misinterpreted anything, then sorry.

As far as I can see, you admit that there can be possible counter-examples to the definition of "exists" that you favour. But that shows that the definition is wrong.

Calling these possible counter-examples "concepts" or "conceptual", as you seem keen to, doesn't change the basic point.

In reply to ripper:


Sorry to go wildly off-topic and all-- but can I just say that I think it's a crying shame the CoE's House of Laity narrowly voted down the proposal to allow women bishops?

Night all

In reply to Tim Chappell: Yes, it's a shame the CoE decided women can't be bishops.

In reply to Tim Chappell:


I rather think it does. They aren't possible counter-examples; they're imaginings. In the same way as a sketch of a fantastic creature is just a sketch (in the set of sketches) and says nothing of the potential for existence of the creature depicted. Maybe we'll just have to disagree as I don't think it can be made any clearer.

Good night

In reply to john arran:


Ah now I see a bit more clearly what we're disagreeing about.

A sketch of a dragon is just a sketch, sure. But that doesn't mean that the sketch says that dragons couldn't exist. On the contrary-- the clearer and more determinate you can make the sketch, the more reason your sketch gives you to think that dragons *can* exist.

As philosophers put it, the possibility of a determinate imagining of x tends to support the possibility of x.

In reply to Tim Chappell: A lovely painting of a dragon makes it more likely that dragons exist?

In reply to Tim Chappell:
>
Of course it does! For the nth time, we can all conceive of dragons, but they don't exist. Conceiving of someting isn't a counter example.

Hope the aadvark sleeps well. I won at squash.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

What! You can't draw something into existance. If I draw £1000000 in my bank, I am no more likely to be a millionaire.

In reply to MG:

Then for the n + 1th time, definitions have to be modally robust: counter-examples to them don't need to be actual, only possible.

Well done at squash. The aardvark is restive, but in his crate.

In reply to Sir Chasm:



I meant something modester than that, something more like: if you can't even conceive it in detail, it's unlikely to be real.

In reply to Tim Chappell: So "the possibility of a determinate imagining of x tends to support the possibility of x" is the way philosophers put it, but it doesn't apply to dragons. Does it only apply to things that philosophers want to believe in?

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Well I need to be able to recognise a bus so I know to get on it. And I need to be able to distinguish buses from not-buses so I don't try to catch a banana by mistake. That provides a definition of bus doesn't it?

In reply to Tim Chappell: So just to pluck an example out of the air, the fact that I can't conceive of a god in general, let alone in detail, means that they are unlikely to be real? Seems fair.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

Disagree with you totally, pet.

Sxx

In reply to crossdressingrodney:

Indeed a bus is a bus like you could have a Earth bus, a Mars bus or a Pleiadian bus, all just a basic means for transport. Same with human beings, like dogs you get different breeds so in an infinite universe we will have thousands of different cousins all on different star systems some no doubt more enlightened that the other.

This thread is just plain retarded what kind of confused individual starts a thread called 'Women can't be Bishops part deux' scuse my french, then starts rambling on about existence of things what we can't see? It's a bit like some goldfish arguing about the pretty colours out side the tank been gods or just stars, then when one of them swims under the bridge they forget what they were discussing and start all over again just with a slightly different context. I did always wonder why my old fish used to keep bumping into the side of the tank like it was trying to get out! And that's another thing, why do Bishops hats look like fish, surely woman would look kinda sexy in em, maybe they're worshiping fish and chips?

In reply to crossdressingrodney:

No. That was my point. Or one of them.

In reply to johnj:

Whatever you're on-- can I have some? Please?

In reply to Rob Exile Ward:



What you would need to deal with that, is for God to come to us and make Himself conceivable...

Oh look, we're back at the Incarnation

In reply to Tim Chappell: Some of us think you already are.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

I'm just on my bed, and no sorry you can't have any of it as then i'd fall on the floor ;+)

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Hello All,
Been busy with stuff. Reading this I am amazed by Tim's obtuseness. MG, John Arran and Victim and others can all see why Tim has not provided counterexamples.

Tim's claimed "counter examples" amount to this: "if I can point to things that *in* *my* [Tim's] *opinion* "exist", but do not "exist" under Coel's definition, then I have a counter-example. This is, of course, hopeless reasoning -- since those things don't exist under my definition they don't provide counter-examples to my definition because they don't "exist" under my definition!

Tim's prime counter-example is other space-time continua:

Tim> Oh for heaven's sake... because it's conceivable that there could be more than one [space-time continuum]

Sure, it is conceivable that there "are" other space-time continua. Do they thereby "exist"? Not under my definition, no. Do they "exist" under some other criteria, such as Tim's opinion? Why yes, they do. So what? You can't claim that because they exist in Tim's opinion, but not under my definition, therefore by definition is refuted -- it is merely that the definitions differ. I'm not obliged to include entities in my set "exists" just because they Tim's-opinion-exist.

[Note: I'm using "Tim's opniion" here because he hasn't given us an actual definition of "exist" or a method of establishing whether something meets the criteria to be in the set "exists".]

Tim> Indeed lots of physicists are busy conceiving it.

Just an aside: In the multiverse scenarios being considered today (e.g. chaotic inflation cosmology) the separate universes are NOT casually disconnected, thus they would "exist" under my definition.

Tim> You have noticed that you contradict yourself here, haven't you? "If there ARE other spacetime continua... they don't exist"?

There's no contradiction if you stick to my definiton of "exists". Nothing in my definition says that things that "are" must necessarily "exist". Indeed I haven't defined "are"; all I've defined is "exist", and it's entirely coherent to state that if there "are" causally disconnected meta-realities, then they don't meet my criterion "exist".

Tim> "Scientists and people in everyday life" don't, in my experience, use any definition of "exists" at all.

Yes they do, they use my definition. What you mean is, they don't bother consulting philosophers for advice on whether particles "exist", they just, de facto, go with my definition.

The other claimed counter-example is "numbers". Again, Tim is merely asserting that because they Tim's-opinion-exist therefore my definition is faulty unless it includes them. That simply does not follow.

In reply to Coel Hellier:
There is an interesting point here. Does something exist if it is unobserved? For instance There could be a green goblin living out a quiet life on some backwater planet as far as it is concerned it exists but as we have not observed it it doesn't to us, or to put it another way did black holes exist before we had the means to measure them? There seems to be a trade off between what we can measure and know to exist and what potentially does exist. Once we get into the realm of potential existing things then we get into likelihoods and that very much depends upon our own expectations. Alternatively may be existence is what can be described mathematically, as most of our robust theories seem to start off with maths

In reply to Tim Chappell:

If you can't describe it (i.e. define what it is) then you have absolutely no way of knowing that you both agree what something is. If I say "that bus is red", how can you know if I am correct (assuming you can't see the bus), without knowing what I mean by red or bus? The very fact that you and Coel clearly understand different things by the word 'exists' illustrates the problem here very clearly.

You seem to be arguing that everyone just somehow knows in their bones what exists means, without being able to put their finger on what that meaning is. Is that fair?


This is still utterly tangential. I don't know why I'm bothering to address it, but since you insist - a baby clearly has no concept of definitions, so that's a ridiculous statement. Even ignoring that, the baby doesn't have to agree whether something is milk or not with anybody, they just have to get fed.


I don't care what philosopher you claim to be channeling, you're either doing a good job of misrepresenting them horribly, or they weren't much of a deep thinker in the first place.

In reply to Postmanpat:


There's nothing circular about that, it's just a definition of a word.


I'm struggling to interpret that. I do indeed regard claims that are not supported by evidence as inadequate.


You're sort of right, a claim with no evidence could indeed be, by lucky chance, right, but it's very unlikely. E.g. A claim about next week's lottery numbers is unlikely to be right, because you won't have any evidence to bear. But it's easy to get evidence about *last* week's lottery numbers, and thus a claim about that, supported by evidence, would be much more likely to be true.


Absolutely, but don't then claim to know them!

In reply to Coel Hellier:


I'm sorry, Coel, but I've read this through quite carefully, and there isn't a single new point in it; you're just repeating the same wrong points you were making before.

I'm going to leave you to it now. I've been pretty patient, I think, but there are limits. So long and all that.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Arf. He's repeating himself because you're 'rebuttals' of his argument are all nonsense. I'm pretty sure the onus there is on you to come up with some actual counter-arguments, not on him to come up with something new to say when you haven't addressed what he's already said. At least I think that's how arguing is meant to work.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Now look what you've done, you made me write you're instead of your. I don't know how you can live with yourself.

In reply to Tim Chappell: That's abit rich coming from somebody who thinks that imagining things makes them more likely to be real.

In reply to Jimbo W:


And my reply is that you can make working hypotheses and then test them. Nothing here has to just be taken on trust.


It does allow for such things! They just don't "exist" (under my definition), they do something else instead, how about we say they "meta-exist" if they "are" but are causally disconnected from us. So, we'll use "meta-exist" for other, disconnected space-time continua, and we'll use "exist" for causally connected things within our space-time continuum.

Happy everyone? Note how Tim's supposed "counter-example" of other space-time continua doesn't refute my definition -- pointing to things which "meta-exist" doesn't show that I need to include them in my set "exists".

In reply to Tim Chappell:


You're right, there isn't. It's just a clear statement of why you've been wrong all along.


Yep, indeed, in a vain hope that you might finally get it. Lots of others on the thread have.


That's ok, no problem. Let's leave it to others to decide which of us doesn't understand.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Well this is what I don't understand. If there is a way of recognising buses then there is a function A which takes the value 0 on x exactly when x is a bus:

x a bus <==> A(x)=0

So then {x | A(x)=0} defines the set of buses.

In reply to Coel Hellier:
Why can it not be both? It just happens that by a fortunate quirk of fate you have alighted upon one possible definition which happens by it's circular nature to support your view.
You can indulge in your own word games all you like to claim that the words "is" and "exist" mean what you want them to mean not what others, including those who have spent a lot more time than either of us considering the subject, consider them to mean but it doesn't make you right, or, more to the point it doesn't make them wrong.
I didn't refer to "claims", I referred to "definitions" and "terms".
See above,this point is irrelevant.

What are you referring to that I claimed to "know"?

In reply to Coel Hellier:
Note how Tim's supposed "counter-example" of other space-time continua doesn't refute my definition -- pointing to things which "meta-exist" doesn't show that I need to include them in my set "exists".

No, there is no reason to invent the term "meta-exist" to replicate the meaning of the term "exist". The onus is on you to create a term for your caveated definition of "exist"

In reply to Postmanpat:
What, incidentlly, is your definition of "meta-exist"?

In reply to Postmanpat:


Hold on, I'm not claiming my definition of "exists" is *right*; I'm not claiming that there is a "right" definition of the word and that mine is closest to it, I'm just saying that it is one possible definition -- and I adopt it because I've never encountered a better one! There are no "right" definitions of words, they're just agreed means of communication.

(And, to me, the cop-out of treating "exists" as "basic" and thus saying you don't have to define it is deeply unsatisfactory. With no definition of "exists" you have no way of establishing whether something meets the criteria for "exists". Tim just says he'd judge that on the evidence; judge it how, against what standard, what criteria? How do you know when something has qualified as "existing"?)

>> Absolutely, but don't then claim to know them!


I wasn't referring to anything in particular. You're pointing out that, given our human limitations, there may be things that exist yet we have no evidence for them. I agree, that's entirely true. But it's not an excuse for people to then go believing in such things. (That's generic "people", not you in particular.)

In reply to Postmanpat:


Ah, so "exists" has a meaning does it? Then please tell us about it! So far Tim has failed. (Close synonyms don't answer this question of what exist "means".)


I don't have one. I'll leave that to anyone who wants to postulate such stuff. I'm happy sticking to what "exists".

In reply to Coel Hellier:


I don't see how creating a working hypothesis and testing it helps. Indeed, these denials really aren't substantive and are rather highly teleological.

Lets try a different tack:
Existence is a priori true.
Because if you object to it, then you recognise a standard (that exists) with which you can judge that statement by.

Being is a priori true.
Because if you object to it, you deny your own subjective being that is objecting.


Perhaps there is a job opening for someone to create a new language for an alien species for the next star trek series?

Can I please refer you back to my initial circularity points in my post you are responding to here, and also to my post above that includes the Einstein quote.

In reply to ripper:

Isn't that what George Galloway said to Saddam Hussein?

In reply to Coel Hellier:


If existence is a primary concept, which I think it is (and was I believe Tim's original point), it isn't definable except by recourse to synonyms and philosophical explanations that attempt to explain what is felt and understood implicitly by most of us who freely use the word.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

Could I also please ask you to comment on my response to crossdressingrodney above:
http://www.ukclimbing.com/forums/t.php?t=528871&delete=7113540#x7113174

In reply to Coel Hellier:
It has the same meaning as "is" means in its plural as in "are" but are causally disconnected from us.
Claiming not to recognise the meaning of the term "is" doesn't make the term invalid.

In reply to Coel Hellier:
Yes, and yours is a peculiarly narrow concept of the word which may be agreed to be useful in specific scientific circles but not in broader usage.
>
Nor is it for me which is why, along with Sean kenny I think the only rational position is to say "I don't know" or "it doesn't matter".
But then again this depends partly on your non definition of evidence. Personally I think at if thirty people at the site of a crash say it was the blue car that caused it I regard it as "evidence" even if the photographic evidence "proves"otherwise. Courts have to weigh up evidence all the time. That some of it is wrong doesn't mean it is not evidence.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

The point is , Coel, that if you simply said that whilst acknowledging the possible theoretical existence of realities or meta-realities of which we may be unaware or may in principle be undiscernable and not causally connected, you regard the latter as irrelevant because they are causally unconnected and undiscernable and regard the evidence for the former as thoroughly unsatisfactory then fine.

Instead you feel the need to create circular and self serving definitions or understandings of terms in order presumably to meet your need to find a neat and coherent argument when things may not be so neat or coherent.

In reply to Postmanpat: What's a meta-reality?

In reply to Sir Chasm:

See coel's use of the term. A reality not causally connected to our reality I think.

One thing occurs to me, thinking it over: perhaps some people on this thread are confusing "definition" with "characterisation". That confusion probably explains why people apparently think I can't say anything at all about "exists" without a definition.

It's fine not to know the difference, of course--people don't always know stuff: this happens. Unless you claim to know exactly what you're talking about in this debate, and yet don't know the difference. If that's true of you, then you're in a muddle. I think Coel is pretty obviously in that muddle; his problem, or one of them, is that he doesn't understand what a definition is. And repeating himself won't get him out of it.

One clear example of this confusion from Coel:

With no definition of "exists" you have no way of establishing whether something meets the criteria for "exists".


Complete rubbish. Do you need a definition of "bus" to know whether something counts as a bus? No, you just need a characterisation of "bus".

In reply to Tim Chappell: Could you contrast a characterization of a bus with a definition of a bus for us?

Coel apparently doesn't understand argument by counter-example, either:

Happy everyone? Note how Tim's supposed "counter-example" of other space-time continua doesn't refute my definition -- pointing to things which "meta-exist" doesn't show that I need to include them in my set "exists".



*Sigh* OK, so suppose Coel says all bananas are brown. And I say "No, this one here is green, and that other is yellow". And Coel says "What rubbish you talk! Can't argue for peanuts! Out of your depth! By my definition, those are meta-bananas!"

Good response? Err, no, not really.

Coel, when you're wrong, don't shout louder and get abusive and endlessly repeat yourself. Just admit you're wrong. Isn't that kind of epistemic humility basic to the good practice of science?

In reply to Sir Chasm:

A definition of a bus would give necessary and sufficient conditions for a bus, conditions such that it would be inconceivable that anything could fit them and not be a bus, or be a bus and not fit them.

There are no such N & S conditions for "bus", and for lots of other concepts too, including "exists".

A characterisation of a bus, on the other hand, is something much looser: it's anything that lets us know what a bus is. Here's one:

http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?q=bus&um=1&hl=en&sa=N&tbo=d&...

Plenty more where that came from.

In reply to Tim Chappell: So no, you can't contrast a characterization of a bus with a definition of a bus for us.

In reply to Sir Chasm:


????? So yes, I just have contrasted a characterization of a bus with a definition of a bus for us.

This is like trying to play poker with chickens...

In reply to Tim Chappell:


It's a perfectly good response if you wish to define bananas as brown and exclude green and yellow items from the category banana. This probably isn't very helpful so no one would agree with your definition.

However, in the case of Coel's "exist" definition, lots of contributors here seem to think it is at least worthy of consideration, so it is indeed a good response to say you are out of your depth when you insist on a non-definition that no one except perhaps PMP finds useful.

Basically you seem to be wrong in insisting that "exist" is a basic concept that everyone understands and feels in way that can not be described.

In reply to Tim Chappell: No you haven't, what is your definition of bus? Perhaps you think you have done so, a bit like the tripe you were peddling last night that if you can draw a picture of dragons they really exist.

In reply to MG:


1) No, it's a hopelessly circular response.

2) If lots of people on here think it's "worthy of consideration"-- well, you know, sorry, but so much the worse for them. What was it Robert Durran said about not settling truth by majority vote?

In reply to Sir Chasm:


Goodness me, you really don't get it, do you? I've just told you: there is no definition of "bus".

In reply to MG:

Basically you seem to be wrong in insisting that "exist" is a basic concept that everyone understands and feels in way that can not be described.


If that's your summary of what I'm saying then you have completely missed the point.

In reply to Sir Chasm:

Which wasn't what he said.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Then what IS your point? That's exactly what I thought it was.

In reply to Coel Hellier:


Tim and others have pointed to the way you are limiting what 'exists' by your definition. You are ruling out certain things. But that aside points to something else - there is always a get out clause which when used brings us back to a point I made earlier: you haven't established much at all. In this particular case you point to current theories allowing a causal connection between separate universes. But the 'in principle' part of your definition of causally connected means that a connection is always lurking around in the background as a possibility because current theories might be superseded. Take, for example, this entry from Wikipedia on ideas about the size of our universe (so not multiverse scenarios, just ours):

'Definition as observable reality
See also: Observable universe and Observational cosmology
According to a still-more-restrictive definition, the universe is everything within our connected space-time that could have a chance to interact with us and vice versa.[citation needed] According to the general theory of relativity, some regions of space may never interact with ours even in the lifetime of the universe, due to the finite speed of light and the ongoing expansion of space. For example, radio messages sent from Earth may never reach some regions of space, even if the universe would live forever; space may expand faster than light can traverse it. It is worth emphasizing that those distant regions of space are taken to exist and be part of reality as much as we are; yet we can never interact with them. The spatial region within which we can affect and be affected is denoted as the observable universe. Strictly speaking, the observable universe depends on the location of the observer. By traveling, an observer can come into contact with a greater region of space-time than an observer who remains still, so that the observable universe for the former is larger than for the latter. Nevertheless, even the most rapid traveler will not be able to interact with all of space. Typically, the observable universe is taken to mean the universe observable from our vantage point in the Milky Way Galaxy.'

Whoever wrote that isn't following your approach ('it is worth emphasizing...'). But my main point is to note the dependence of the statement about non-interaction on current theories of space-time.

(as an aside, and back to the 'it is worth emphasizing...', what do you think about the point about an observer who travels to a different location being able to come into contact with a greater region of space-time? Would you reformulate that to say that more space time has come into existence? If you would, aren't you taking a rather earth-centred perspective?)

In reply to MG:


Corrected that for you. Now, can you justify how that position is wrong?

In reply to Jimbo W: He said "the clearer and more determinate you can make the sketch, the more reason your sketch gives you to think that dragons "can" exist". Draw a nice picture and dragons are more likely, as I said, tripe.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

All very interesting (maybe) but what has this exchange to do with the subject, ie. whether women can be bishops or not, or to rephrase it, whether an organisation should be allowed to discriminate against one gender in the 21st century and in Britain?

In reply to Sir Chasm:

"Can" being the operative word that was being clearly emphasised. The concept defines a relatedness between the subjective and the objective. The clearer an idea can be sketched, crystalised etc the more likely the idea inheres upon the subjective appreciation of objective reality. Thus he went on to say:


Its really quite a basic idea.

In reply to Bruce Hooker:


Nothing. I think everyone except Coel, thought it was a ridiculous decision. Coel didn't mind the decision because he felt it undermined the church, and that is something that he wants.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

Here is my take on the topics discussed in the last 500 posts:

Modern natural science works on the basis that there is a reality external to our mind, which is constituted of the totality of elements that are in principle able to interact causally.

As scientists we are therefore employing an operational definition of existence, which must of course include some precept of testing this. Direct observation using our senses (controlling for illusions) is the obvious way, i.e. I would accept that unicorns exist if I see one.

However, for current questions the means of detecting interaction with entitities we accept as existing are much more complicated and rely strongly on implicit assumptions (i.e., we trust and control that the instruments we use to measure some property really work as we think).

The key difference between science and philosophy/religion appears to me that we scientists are happy with such an operational definition, as it has served us well in generating a consistent, adaptable, framework for formulating theories describing the world we live in. The practical output in form technological progress comes as a bonus and illustrates this point.

The level of this progress is such that in disciplines like neurobiology and physics/cosmology we can now address questions (i.e. the origin of the mind or the origin and fate of the universe) that until recently were not testable and hence in the realm of speculation/religion and philosophy.

Clearly, these fields of course lose sovereignity of interpretation as natural science gains it, as it is happening since the age of enlightenment.

This is not to argue that philosophy does not have an important place in modern society, ethics being one prominent example.

However, by clinging to some shrinking god-of-the-gaps explanatory monopoly or engaging in neo-angels-on-pinheads sophistry philosophers run in danger of making themselves look like fools.


CB

In reply to Coel Hellier: I am, at least I think I am, therefore I must be.

In reply to Jimbo W: Well we've got 2 statements, one saying that a good sketch makes the it more likely that the object exists and one saying that if you can't conceive of the details the object is unlikely to be real. Those 2 statements don't make the same claim. So which is the basic claim?

In reply to Postmanpat:


So "broader usage" often talks about things that have no causal connection to our universe? Can you give me examples of things commonly talked about that have no causal connection with us?


So would I, and I've not said otherwise.

In reply to cb294:

This limited usage of "exist" is a useful for the purpose of defining that which can be "observed" or "analysed" by our own perceptions and technologies. One cannot conclude from this that nothing else "is".

I can define "sport" as "football" but however much I insist on this I have not demonstrated that no other sports exist.

Indeed, Coel has acknowledged that things other than those "discernable" to us may "be". Since "science" seems to have adopted a definition of "exist"that excludes the "undiscernable" or apparantly "not causally connected" what would you like to call the discipline that considers these "things"?

In reply to Postmanpat:


I'm still baffled as to why you think my definition is circular. Can you spell that out?


If you mean, I try my best to understand things as best I can, then yes I do; and I do fully accept that that understanding might be piss poor compared to true reality.

In reply to Jimbo W:

Well as this thread demonstrates there are a variety of different concepts of what exists means.

In reply to Postmanpat:


Metaphysics perhaps?

In reply to Coel Hellier: 'understanding might be piss poor compared to true reality. '

I would say more than that - it is inevitable. What evolutionary benefit would have been derived from having a brain powerful enough to 'truly' understand the nature of reality, whatever that might mean? Zip - the philosopher would always have been beaten to the girl by the lad with the smaller (though still remarkable) brain but bigger muscles.

In reply to Coel Hellier:
Did I say they were "commonly talked about"?

So you'll agree there is lots of evidence for phenomenon like telepathy, ghosts etc etc?

In reply to Tim Chappell:


Tim apparently doesn't understand argument by counter-example, either:


That only works if it is agreed that the "this one" and "that one" that you point to were indeed "bananas". If that were agreed, your counter-example would indeed hold.


Exactly. If it were *not* agreed that the green and yellow things you are pointing to are "bananas", if, say, they were pears, then your counter-example would not be demonstrated.


I'm genuinely baffled as to your inability to understand this point -- plenty of others on this thread see it!


Try listening to yourself sometime Tim, take your own advice. It's not only me who thinks you are wrong on this point.

Is there something about philosophers that means they can't talk to the rest of the world? Tim and Jimbo seem to understand whatever it is they are saying, and the rest on this thread seem to understand each other. But both groups are completely baffled by the other. Has philosophy become so detached from "normal" people that it can no longer communicate with them?

In reply to Coel Hellier:
Because it simply restates the conclusion in another form.

Do you think that human abilities are capable of understanding the "true realites" and "meta-realities"?

In reply to John Gillott:


Yes and yes (though only as "existing", not as "meta-existing"; I'm fully aware that I'm only defining a word, not changing reality by that definition).


Agreed, you don't "establish" facts about reality by making definitions, you establish those facts by evidence.


Under my "chain of causal links" definition, those distant regions are always causally connected and so always "exist" in my definition (regardless of our ability to see them from Earth -- again, you're focusing on the wrong part of what I'm saying, I am *not* making a definition that is peculiar to humans or to earth, and I re-stated in terms of "chain of causal links" to make that clearer).

In reply to Coel Hellier:

"Metphysics"-"the study of things that are not".

In reply to Postmanpat:

>> I'm still baffled as to why you think my definition is circular. Can you spell that out?


Can you spell it out further? What conclusion? I'm really not understanding why this definition is circular.

In reply to Coel Hellier: If I imagine a dragon (say) and that makes me happy. Does that mean the dragon exists under your definition as it has affected me?

In reply to Postmanpat:


No idea; possibly not.

In reply to MG:


No, the only thing that has affected you is the idea of the dragon, not the dragon. Yes, the idea of the dragon exists.

In reply to Postmanpat:

>> So would I, and I've not said otherwise.


Nope, because the evidence is that human observers are often reliable on reporting car colour, especially if a number of them concur. The evidence says that humans are fairly unreliable in reporting claims of telepathy, ghosts etc.

In reply to Coel Hellier:
>

Well, under current theories, those distant regions are not causally connected to us. Agreed?

Let's now think / speculate about a multiverse in which the different universes are not causally connected to each other, and so everywhere outside of our universe is not causally connected to us. You would say they don't exist. But each part of each one is causally connected to something.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

Actually, the evidence is that humans are pretty unreliable at reporting both.
Anyway, another of your circular arguments.

In reply to Jimbo W:


Quoting:

"Again, my view is that the way we do this is with the coordination of our senses of our external world with the one piece of knowledge we think is securely established, that I am. This feeling, quality, which we call "being" is something we attribute to things appreciated by our sense of the world around us, i.e. that the world also has "being". We can't define these terms, but there is a referential "essence" that we can appreciate subjectively and attribute to other things."

At root we have sense data and experiences. All attributions of "being" are best attempts to make sense of that. We can make hypotheses, then test them. We attribute "being" to an external world because that makes sense of our sense data and experiences. We can then go further and ask how far we should attribute "being". I'm going as far as attributing it to everything in a chain of causal links with that primary sense data.

In reply to John Gillott:


There is a chain of causal connections connecting them to us. Very distant bit A is causally connect to slightly-nearer bit B which is causally connected to .... us at Z. The limitation here is the finite speed of light/communication which limits the speed at which causes can travel along that chain of causal links. But, there is still a chain of causal links, and thus the distant regions "exist" under my definition.


Yes. Though I'd be happy to say that they "meta-exist".

In reply to Tim Chappell:


You're getting very hung up on the difference between a "definition" and a "characterisation". They are much the same thing, one is just a bit looser (and often useful when a category doesn't have a clear-cut boundary, but merges into another category; cf, sapling, shrub, bush, tree).

But fine, if you prefer, I'll restate my questions using "characterisation" instead:

Please give us your characterisation of the category "exists". What does it mean to say something "exists"? How does one establish whether something qualifies for the category "exists"?

You're right that you can do this without a rigid definition if you instead have a decent characterisation. So what is your characterisation of "exists"?

In reply to MG:

I quite agree. The difference is that Coel's postion posits models that allow us to predict. That is quite a powerful difference between the 'scientific' position and the navel-gazing of theologians who seem too wrapped up in linguistics.


NS has a take on 'what truly exists':

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21628920.200-what-truly-exists-struct...

In reply to Coel Hellier:

Far be it from me to query a statement by you on physics, but, well, are you sure about that first bit (causal connection A - Z)? Plenty of talking head theoretical physicists on more than one recent Horizon argued otherwise, and it looks like someone who agrees with them wrote that Wikipedia entry I quotes from earlier.

I can't get very excited about this new concept meta-exist I'm afraid. It seems like an evasion. You're a non-believer so invoking God as the being who was going to detect these causal influences was odd on your part I thought. You re-formulated it without him, but that didn't solve the problem. Now it seems you are trying to get away from human limitations by talking about meta-existence. It can't be done. 'In Principle' is the Achilles heel of your definition.

In reply to Postmanpat:

Exactly. It would be easy to observe other sports being played. The only reasonable conclusion is therefore to reject your definition as wrong.

The important bit is that we can confidently make a statement on whether football exists because we can clearly say how to test for it, and then do the experiment (although watching my home team Nuremberg one cannot be so sure...).

Less easy for the Higgs boson, where it took some effort to finaly demonstrate that it exists.

On the other hand Quidditch (Sp?), at least the proper version involving flying brooms, does not exist, even though we can make very detailed images of it being played.


I obviously assume that you agree that your definition of sport is wrong. In this you follow teh common sense approach that Coel and to a lesser extent I have argued: A definition of existence is useless unless it tells you how to decide whether some entity fulfils it.



Speculation? Insanity?

Seriously, we should not even expect to be able to detect everything that exist, simply because our human facilities are too limited. Even 150 years ago we had no means of identifying viruses, although they definitley existed and killed people.

However, this practical limitation does not prevent us from defining existence as an ability to affect other things known to exist. At least for the bits of reality we can observe this works nicely, and leads to a consistent and functional description of the world.

CB

In reply to John Gillott:


Yes. Your quote from wiki was: "It is worth emphasizing that those distant regions of space are taken to exist and be part of reality as much as we are; yet we can never interact with them".

That states that the two ends of the chain of causal links can never swap information with each other, because the information takes a finite time to travel along the chain, and the chain is lengthening as it travels (because of the expansion of the universe), and the chain gets longer at a faster rate than the signal travels.

However, that doesn't alter the fact that there is still a chain of causal links between those two ends, and that any part of that chain can communicate with its neighbouring links.


I'm not excited about it either, but it's not really evasion, it's more a genuine attempt to answer a worthwhile question: if there are "other realities" that are causally disconnected from our universe, such that even in principle there can never be any information exchange between those "realities" and our "reality", then can they be said to "exist"? People are welcome to answer that as they see fit ... it just comes down to what one means by "exist". So far I'm the only one who has attempted a characterisation of "exists".


It's not me who wants to posit meta-existences.


I'm still totally baffled as to what your objection is.

In reply to cb294:
Yes, but it is wrong not because you keep saying it is wrong but because you have positive observable evidence it is wrong. A lack of evidence (which anyway depends on Coel's circular definition of evidence) is not a proof of something.
Only if you believe that anything that is not neat and coherent is not "useful"
So, you acknowledge that things can "exist" that we are not aware of and may or may not be causally connected?

Of course it's "consistent and functional" and therefore within the scientific context, useful. I have sad that several times. A definition of sport as football may be useful but that does not make its assumptions true.
Other defintions useful in other "metaphysical" or "philosophical" contexts.

In reply to Coel Hellier:

Can you clarify: I thought the term "causally connected" applied to events (or regions) of space-time, rather than points in space: A is causally connected to B if there exists a time-like path from A to B. So shouldn't you be talking about regions of space time, rather than of space?

Also, causal connection is directed. Writing A -> B for "B is in the forward light-cone of A", you get

A -> B and B -> C implies A -> C

but you don't get

A - > B and C -> B implies A -> C

so you can't causally connect regions of space-time outside the observable universe.

In reply to crossdressingrodney:


Yes.


True, yes. But there is still a chain of causal connections connecting the two (see above reply to John Gillot).

In reply to Coel Hellier:

Causal connection even though it is impossible to exchange information? How does something at A have a causal connection to something at Z if it is impossible for information to pass from A to Z? The limitation is the same isn't it? Neither influence nor information can pass from A to Z according to current theory.

You are trying to specify a definition of 'exist'. In part you do it by using the phrase 'In Principle'. But you can't clearly specify what 'In Principle' means because you can't escape the limitations of current theory. You say, eg, multiverses don't exist if there is no causal connection between them. But then you have your aside that current theories say some kinds are connected so you say those kinds do exist. In 300 years time we will no doubt think different kinds exist under your definition. It's a moving feast and you haven't really ruled much, if anything, out.

In reply to John Gillott:


*Chain* *of* causal connections, even though it is impossible to exchange information between the *ends* of the chain.


I'm not positing a "causal connection" between A and Z, I'm saying that A and Z are linked by a *chain* *of* causal connections.


Then use my "chain of causal connections" definition instead, which doesn't depend on the "in principle" observation.

In reply to Tim Chappell:

compare with:

Me: Well you used a quasi mathematical series of statements, which lead me to assume that, just as in real maths, such statements would be 'true' or 'false'.

You: And so they are.

See the confusion? Either you're problem is resolvable using a maths lookaike in which things are true or false in which case the tool for the job is a maths lookalike OR the problem is not resolvable using such tools, in which case you need to use something else.

In reply to 999thAndy: And sorry for the delay in replying, but I did enjoy the horlicks.

In reply to John Gillott:


Yes. Or rather, that is the definition of "exist" that I've arrived at. Maybe it would be helpful to explain more about why I like that definition.

Suppose we allow that "causally disconnected other universes" exist. Now let us a posit a new type of particle, say a Hoggs Boson, that is to postulated to interact with other Hoggs Bosons but is also posited to be casually disconnected with all other material in our universe, and so has no interactions whatsoever with any material in our universe, and so can never (even in principle) be detected.

Would you say that that Hoggs Boson "exists"? Physicists would not say that. They would either say that it didn't exist, or they'd shrug their shoulders and say that the concept was irrelevant or uninteresting. But they would not say that that thing "exists".

How about you, what you you say? (And Tim, what would philosophers say, would they accept that such a thing would/could "exist"?)

If you say that it wouldn't "exist", then why are you giving a different answer to this question than about the causally disconnected other-universe?

If you say it it would or could exist then you hit big problems. You then have no way of establishing whether something "exists"; you could postulate ghosts, unicorns, faeries and all sorts, just with the rider "sure they exist, it's just they have no interaction with our universe", and so there could never be evidence for them.

That, to me, ends up making the concept "exist" pretty meaningless, and thus, by thinking back through the above, I then want to say that the causally disconnected other-universe also does not "exist".

If someone wants to posit a meta-existence for the Hoggs boson and faeries and disconnected other-universes and so forth then they are welcome to do so.


Why, ***sure***. What I'm getting at is what we mean by "exist". That's a very different thing from whether humans know whether something exists.


I'm not trying to rule anything out! You don't change reality by changing definitions! (Only Tim is silly enough to think that if you change a definition then it changes how the world is.) All I'm doing is trying to think through what we mean by "exist" and thus define the word. What do *you* mean by the word? Does the Hoggs Boson "exist"?

In reply to Coel Hellier:

I'm not sure this chain of connections from A to Z really warrants the label "causal" if the two points A and Z are not causally connected!

Also, I'm pretty sure that every path in space-time can be locally deformed into a collection of these causally connected chains, if you don't mind that the arrow-of-time changes direction along the way (as you appear not to). So perhaps a more natural way of stating it is just that A and Z can be connected by a path in space-time.

In reply to MG:


I'm not sure "the rest of the thread" does anything of the sort!

PMP seems to have his own thoughtful expressions on this issue, as does John Gillott, sg and indeed Sir Chasm. For sure there are certainly a number of sheep following their shepherd Coel, regurgitating and repeating his teleological and circular explanations. You show no evidence of having tried to understand our position. Indeed two posts of mine re: circularity, and the other re: einstein, and another, re: a priori truths have still gone unanswered. The philosophical ideas being expressed here are far from new, and not ours, they are commonly understood problems of epistemology and our relationship to reality. Being an anti-philosopher is fine, which seems to me to be really what's going on here, but it should be recognised for what it is, a prejudicial position that involves alot of wishful thinking, a number of assumptions / pre-suppositions so as to place science and its methodology at the heart of everything, even so as to redefine linguistics. Its a quite hilarious form of scientism expressed to the level of absurdity.

In reply to Jimbo W:


This isn't really true, I've answered you as best I can. To the extent that I don't answer you it's likely because I don't understand what you're getting at.

The gist of my last reply to you was this: you are saying that we have to make a priori and unchallengeable assumptions and base our worldview on that. I'm saying we don't, we make working hypotheses and then challenge and test them.

In reply to Jimbo W:

It seems to me that the idea that both you and Coel have, that we 'attribute' existence to things is very similar to the old mistake of regarding existence as a predicate. Mind you, some say it is. One of hardest essays I ever had to write at university was in answer to the question 'Is existence a predicate?'

Just throwing that into the cauldron, because I have absolutely no time today to discuss it, sadly.