About this time last year I made some predictions for the Brexit negotiations based on TMay's Lancaster House speech on this forum. I thought it would be interesting to dig them out to see whether I still stand by them and to make some follow-up predictions. I recognise this is a bit self-indulgent. Sorry for that but if you can't do it over christmas...
So here goes. What are your predictions?
> 1. Getting the divorce settlement and trade agreement simultaneously done within two years. More than very difficult, I actually think this is impossible - for me 0% probability
The past 12 months has confirmed my view. In 12 months we have mostly resolved 2 of the 3 first issues. Finance settlement feels pretty much done, citizens rights is almost there but with a few bits and pieces to go (family reunion rights for UK citizens in the EU). Northern Ireland has been kicked down the road. We still have many, many other issues to negotiate (transition, security cooperation, participation in future EU programmes, trade, customs union) and I still think there is zero probability we will get all that done in the next 12 months.
Follow-up prediction: I think that by this time next year we will have agreement on some of the major divorce issues (financial settlement, citizens rights, transition, security cooperation) and others will be kicked down the road: Northern Ireland, customs. On trade I expect we’ll have a political statement of intent but very little substance.
I am going to make a further prediction that I don’t think the trade agreement will be fully tied up by the end of the transition.
> 2. Membership of the customs union, control over immigration and a common travel area with Northern Ireland. I'm stumped on how you combine these three. Not quite impossible, but very hard. 15% probability (i think they'll end up with a common travel area with northern Ireland but compromise on customs union / immigration control.)
A few points here. First, the problem has actually changed since I wrote this prediction. In TMay’s Lancaster House speech the problem was framed as reconciling maintaining the Irish Common Travel Area with Britain taking control over immigration. In the way it was framed, the real problem was free movement but in the past few months it has become clear that the real problem was around trade. In my predictions I had added “membership of the customs union” to the problem (I don’t think I was especially prescient here as, from memory, I think the general commentators were making the same point.). This was because, later in her speech Theresa May said: “I do not want Britain to be part of the Common Commercial Policy and I do not want us to be bound by the Common External Tariff. These are the elements of the Customs Union that prevent us from striking our own comprehensive trade agreements with other countries. But I do want us to have a customs agreement with the EU. ”
Which I took to mean membership of the customs union. In any case, whether the UK is a member of
the customs union or
a customs union, the point is still the same – you can have two of the following three:
• tariff and non-tariff free trade between northern Ireland and the republic of Ireland
• no physical border between Northern Ireland and the republic of ireland
• regulatory divergence
But you can’t easily have all three. I still think you can’t have all three. The original challenge over free movement seems to have been solved by the birth right of Northern Irish citizens to have Irish, UK or dual Irish-UK citizenship.
Despite the fact that this has been completely kicked down the road in the Progress Report (if anyone is looking for an EU concession made in stage one it is surely accepting the fudge on NI as “sufficient progress”), I am getting more optimistic that they will find an agreement on this topic. I’d lift my original estimate of 15% to 30%. I now believe the compromise will lie somewhere between no physical border and regulatory alignment. (i.e. there probably will be some physical infrastructure at the border (80% probability) and there will probably be limits to UK ability to diverge from EU regulations (80%) – this last prediction is basically a re-hash of the Progress Report anyway)
> 3. Membership of the customs union, opt-out of the Common External Tariff and a free trade agreement. Also seems intractable. 25% probability.
We really haven’t seen any progress on this so hard to update my original estimate. In general, though we have seen that the EU is very unwilling to diverge from their negotiating guidelines and that they have the leverage to defend them. So I’m going to reduce my estimate from 25% to 20%. I think the UK will be either clearly in or clearly out of the customs union. Most likely clearly out (75% probability).
> 4. Control over immigration. I think they'll get this. 75% probability
Interestingly, this topic has just completely dropped off the agenda over the past 12 months. I’ll raise my original prediction to 90% probability.
> 5. Rights for EU nationals in the UK and vice versa. Both sides want this and it should be easy to do. 90% probability. The devil will be in the implementation.
It seems that this has already been achieved and I think the progress report confirms my suspicion that the devil will be in the implementation. I didn’t anticipate that the principle of reciprocity would effective put the UK government in the position of pushing to reduce the rights of UK nationals in the EU (esp. on family reunion rights but there is also now a grey area over whether we will need to register for an equivalent to settled status).
I’ll claim a win here.
> 6. Co-operation on security and science. No-brainer. 95% probability.
No new information on this and I’m sticking by my original prediction.
(original predictions here:
https://www.ukclimbing.com/forums/t.php?n=656944&v=1#x8483479)
Edited to add:
I missed the most obvious sticking point by not giving any prediction on the settlement bill. In restrospect that was a major omission.
Post edited at 14:40