In reply to Jon Stewart:
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> Thanks, that's interesting but I don't think that's what I was suggesting. I was just saying that using Greece and Portugal as evidence of what happens if you don't follow the precise pace and policy mix for deficit reduction chosen by the Tories is simply bogus.
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> That doesn't address my point. We're talking about the room to manoeuvre within a broad strategy of cutting spending while not completely crashing the economy. Not what needs to be cut within the Tories' plans and which Depts budgets will necessarily be hit. If the initial rate of deficit reduction chosen was slower, and more tax rises and better tax collection included in the policy mix, then the cuts to welfare, for example, could have been a thorough overhaul of the system which cut out waste but protected the vulnerable.
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It did appear to be one of your points when you said "The priority has been to align the cuts with with puke-making 'scroungers' rhetoric," The breakdown of the cuts doesn't support that argument.
On the broader question of the size and speed of the cuts and the balance of spending cuts and tax rises the numbers don't really support your position either. Total cuts of 2.6% over 5 years are, as noted above, much less then eg.Callaghan's cuts in the 1970s and much smaller than those in places like Greece and Portugal. In so much as they were front loaded, which is not much, the front loading was of capital expenditure cuts (as planned by Labour, because they are easily done and people don't miss what they never had), and tax cuts, because they are quick and easy to execute. Current spending cuts have been of a fairly steady trajectory which is what the academic research tends to approve of.I can provide the figures if you like.
As for the mix of tax rises and spending cuts to achieve consolidation, there is academic argument,as you'd expect over the best mix, but plenty of support for the coalition approach (which about balanced about 75/25 in favour of cuts). Work by Erceg and Linde of the Fed, supported by others (Uhlig, Alssini blah blah), suggest that the negative impact on output of a spending based consolidation is half that of a tax based consolidation.
The key, as noted, of course, is to pitch monetary easing (ie.QE) to offset the negative impact of fiscal consolidation and this is why the BOE has become increasingly aggressive in doing just that.
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> You're right, I have no idea how this works, but I hear over and over again that the comparison with Greece etc (PIGS?) is bogus, because of the pound being our own currency, not being the Euro. If that's your idea of demonstrating the counterfactual, then I'm afraid I feel that you're trying to pull the wool over my eyes with an argument you know to be bogus. I'd need better evidence than that to be convinced that we know how markets would have reacted to a slower deficit reduction plan and a different policy mix to achieve it.
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IT's pretty simply how it workd-just the same if you lent your mate some money, kept coming back for more but showed no indication of being able to curb his spending and his need for more money. You'd charge him more interest or stop lending to him!
The PIGS scenario is just an example of what can happen. The clearest evidence is simply to monitor gilt yields against indications and the realty of government fiscal consolidation. Every time there is fear of back sliding, yields rise. This of course has been encouraged by pressure by the IMF (and ECB) to consolidate. I can send you endless City research reports and newspaper articles to support the point or go away and chart gilt yields against spending announcements but it would really be a waste of time I don't have demonstrating what any bond trader will tell you is the blindingly obvious.
As SARS points out, the UK has the ability to buy its own bonds (QE) to offset market sentiment, which is partly why they have not surged. But as SARS also points out, this is in itself quite a risky game.
Of course the IMF itself has acknowledged that it underestimated the negative impact of austerity (hence the ECBs late conversion to QE to offset this) and I think it quite possible that in a few years time we'll look back and say they markets were quite mad in insisting on "austerity" but that doesn't enable governments to ignore the markets at the time.
> Perhaps you can explain this, in layman's terms: the govt set out plans for spending and borrowing, which then all went massively tits up as growth was nowhere to be seen and borrowing continued to rise. Yet the bond markets seemed not to give a toss. Is this really because the Tories banged on and on about spending cuts which it was plain to see weren't happening. Does the interest rate on our borrowing really depend on some flimsy psychological impression about whether the chancellor would like to cut spending, even though it's proved completely unachievable and everyone watching can see?
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Firstly, the coalition has pretty much met its spending plans, the problem is that slow growth meant lower tax revenues than budgeted hence smaller deficit cuts than targeted,
See above: a) the BOE buys lots of bonds to hold yields down (QE) b) the markets see a continued commitment to holding down spending, and an economy that is flatlining but not cratering and also has lots of cheap money that is needs to do something with, like, er, buy bonds.
Also see, above, I fear that at some stage the markets may flip and decide they wanted a Keynesian stimulus after all, but they haven't yet.
To make my personal position clear-I actually have quite a lot of sympathy with the Krugman view although I have yet to see the bond market and borrowing cost problem adequately addressed. Even if one buys into the stimulus argument is would probably still imply welfare cuts etc because the stimulus would be via infrastructural project etc(which is what Osborne is pretending he is doing).
My problem is with the arguments that:
a) The coalition stategy is "mad " and without academic foundation. Neither is true.
b) That the stimulus approach is a "magic switch". It is a very high risk gamble that it would not push up rates and crater the economy.
c)That the cuts are savage and front loaded and target welfare and the poor. They are none of those things.
Essentially, whatever the coalition's real wishes, it is constrained by what the electorate, the markets, and global institutions, will enable it to do-hence it comes up with the muddle through that we have and that Labour would probably match.
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> The other point was that I assume that markets respond better to hard data, rather than political fluff (unlike voters). I'm unconvinced that when a government fails to cut spending as it said it would, that the markets respond not to the reality of what's going on, but to the asinine rhetoric about 'scroungers' having their curtains closed at certain hours of the day. I'm suggesting that if interest rates stay low when the planned cuts to public spending completely fail to materialise, then they would also have stayed low if a more moderate plan without the frothy/thickie-right wing agenda had been pursued from the start.
So I still believe that the problem you have is that you believe the presentation and hate it. Also you confuse the presentation. There are two strands: the "scrounger rhetoric" is not primarily aimed at the markets is is aimed at "pebble dash" voters. The "fiscal rectitude" rhetoric which exaggerates the extent of the cuts is aimed at the markets.