In reply to birdie num num:
> Diplomacy with IS?
> <smirk>
Why are you suggesting that I'd promote diplomacy with IS? They're mad as a box of frogs and, importantly, as far into power as they're ever going to get. For the leaders, there is no alternative scenario which gives them the kind of power (and thus trappings) that they have now. If we were, theoretically, to sit them down, what exactly *could* we offer them anyway? 'Well, Aziz, you currently have a direct line to Allah and 20,000 men ready to die at your command. You hold absolute power over the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and most of the world's leaders fear your next move. Tell you what, old son, if you agree to stop believing in all this Allah stuff, we'll give you a semi in Croydon and a job on the railways. We'll even throw in a Skoda Octavia'.
This is what I'm talking about when I say the debate has just polarised now, without much real thought. It's just easier to make these assumptions about opposing arguments than to put some effort in. And given that the government has just declared its future plan for intervening in the middle east, a bit of thought is what's needed right now: once the sabre-rattling jingoism over the assassination of a couple of deserving little sh*ts has died down, where exactly are we now?
I actually used the term 'strangle', as in 'they [Iran] have the potential to influence Syria and, importantly, strangle the ability of IS to operate'. Strangling and having a chat over a cup of tea and some hob nobs are two fairly different approaches - although both would be more likely to actually achieve results than dropping bombs on Syria. Iran and IS are both run by fundamentalist bigots, but Iran's leaders are willing to negotiate their zealotry against power. They're pretty dreadful, but we long ago saw any chance of a perfect solution ride off into the sunset (as in, sometime in the 19th century. We may have been partly responsible).
So, again. If I put forward the argument that there were some major problems with the planning, execution and justification of and for the drone killings, it doesn't mean that I've any sympathy with the terrorists; nor does it mean that I'm non-interventionist. If I think that stability in the region is more likely to be achieved through diplomatic solutions with recognised governments, it certainly doesn't mean that I think we should be having a chat with IS. I suspect that Iran's way of dealing with IS - who stand in their way much of the time - would be a lot dirtier and more ruthless than ours. And way more effective. That we don't currently like Iran very much may be of secondary importance: we didn't like the IRA much, but we sat them around a table, nurtured their ascendancy to (very limited) power and are now finding that the process is falling apart, for much the same reasons as outlined at the start - a bunch of people who held real-life power twenty years ago are struggling to come to terms with the limited nature of regulated, democratic power.
We simply cannot keep trying to bomb our way to success, or to continue a tit-for-tat strategy where we focus only on what our enemies did last, rather than what we did to elicit their response in the first place. Unfortunately, as most of our domestic, two party politics seem to revolve around the latter principle, it's a bit ingrained in us.